The World Trade Organization and Its Interpretation of the Article XX Exceptions to the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, in Light of Recent Developments by Bowen, Brandon L.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND ITS
INTERPRETATION OF THE ARTICLE XX EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL
AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, IN LIGHT OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS
Brandon L. Bowen*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 182
H. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX OF THE GATr .............. 183
A. Defining Article XX ................................... 183
B. Early Cases: Herring-Salmon and Thailand-Cigarette ....... 185
C. Tuna-Dolphin I & I .................................. 186
D. The WTO and Article.XX .............................. 190
III. WTO SPECIAL REPORT ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT ..... 195
A. The Status of the Environment .......................... 195
B. Economics and Environmental Policy .................... 198
C. The Regulatory Chill .................................. 199
IV. CONCLUSION .......................................... 201
* J.D. 2001, The University of Georgia
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 30, 1999, the World Trade Organization (WTO) attempted
to hold a summit in Seattle, Washington, that was intended to begin a
Millennial Round of trade negotiations.' The WTO summit, however, was
disrupted by tens of thousands ofprotestors.' Commentators have said that the
demonstrations and marches in Seattle were reminiscent of the activism of the
1960s.' The demonstrators, to whom The Economist referred as "militant
dunces" represented diverse interests such as those of the Teamsters and the
Sierra Club." In Ralph Nader's words, "[tihere's never been an event in
American history that has brought together so many disparate groups."'
What brought so many protestors with divergent interests to Seattle to
protest the WTO? A simple answer might be that they believe that the WTO's
devotion to free trade places corporate profits ahead of sovereign interests,
worker rights, and environmental viability.6 The Nation stated, "[t]he attempt
to write a constitution for the global economy that protects property rights but
tramples workers' rights and environmental and consumer protections is
generating a growing and unrelenting popular opposition."'
For environmentalists, the cause celebr6 was the endangered sea turtle.8 In
1995, the WTO ruled against a trade sanction designed to prevent the
extinction of the sea turtle after finding that the sanction would be unfair to
foreign trade interests.9 The reasoning behind the decision is complex and
unclear to many people, although this uncertainty has not prevented vociferous
commentaries. As the WTO itself has stated, "[o]ne of the unfortunate features
of the trade and environment debate is that at times it has generated more heat
than light."'" The purpose of the following is not to question the validity of free
trade, but to show that the roots of the trade versus environment dispute can be
1 See Doug Henwood, Free Trade, Fair Trade, Whose Trade? A Forum, THENATION, Dec.
6, 1999, at 11.
2 See Kenneth Klee, The Seige of Seattle, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 30.
3 See Michael Elliott, The New Radicals, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 1999, at 36.
4 Clueless in Seattle, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 4, 1999, at 17.
' Elliott, supra note 3, at 36.
6 See id. at38.
The People vs. the WTO, THE NATION, Dec. 6, 1999, at 3.
s See Elliott, supra note 3, at 36-37.
9 See WTO Appellate Body, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (98-3899) (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Shrimp-Sea Turtle
Appellate Report].
10 HAKAN NORDSTROM AND SCOTT VAUGHAN, TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT I (World Trade
Organization Special Studies 4, 1999).
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found in the WTO's dispute resolution process and to consider how recent
developments may affect that process.
II. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XX OF THE GATT
A. Defining Article XX
The first General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into effect
in 1947, and the agreement exists in its current form as GATT 1994." The
purpose of Article XX of the GATT is to allow "countries to sidestep the
normal trading rules if necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."" Article XX consists of a list of exemptions preceded by a defining
and limiting chapeau. 3 For purposes of clarity, relevant subsections of Article
XX are reproduced in an abridged form below:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in the Agreement, shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health;
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent with the provision of this agree-
ment...;
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 4
The list of exceptions in the original GAIT agreement was submitted by the
United States to be included in the unsuccessful International Trade Organiza-
" General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947,61 Stat. A- 11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GAIT].
12 NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 9.
" 'Chapeau,' defined as a top hat is the term generally used to refer to the introductory
provision of Article XX. See WEBSTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 184 (g. & C. Merriam
Co. 1980).
"4 GATT, supra note 11, at art. XX.
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tion Charter (ITO).' Some nations expressed fear that the exceptions,
especially those premised on environmental protection, would be used
unfairly. 6 If there were no precautions, the exemptions could allow for
regulations that were facially conservationist but were enacted to protect
domestic markets and producers. Developed countries, with their more
powerful and self-sufficient economies, would theoretically be able to
manipulate third world markets and industries. 7 To avoid possible manipula-
tion, the chapeau was added to the ITO charter and subsequently incorporated
into Article XX of the GATT, directly above the list of exceptions." The
chapeau has been a source of great contention and, so far, has been interpreted
to defeat all regulations that have relied upon an Article XX exception as a
justification.
The key phrase of the chapeau is "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade."' 9 A plain reading of this phrase would indicate that the
chapeau only applies a reasonableness and good faith requirement on nations
implementing trade regulations for purposes permitted under the Article XX
exceptions. The term, 'arbitrary' is defined as based on a whim and is
generally used to refer to a decision based on preference alone, or without a
stated reason." 'Unjustifiable' has a similar meaning and implies the
performance of a balancing test between the benefit sought and the burden
incurred.' Instead of weighing the benefit to the environment against the
burden on the plaintiff, the Dispute Settlement Board (DSB), the entity charged
with hearing trade disputes, weighs the benefit to the defending nation against
the burden placed on the multilateral trading system.' That interpretation
shifts the balance, placing a greater burden on the defending nation and the
environment.
The terms 'arbitrary' and 'unjustified' are attached to the clause "where
similar conditions prevail,"" which should indicate nations that produce similar
"s See Padideh Ala'i, Free Trade or Sustainable Development? An Analysis of the WTO
Appellate Body's Shift to a More Balanced Approach to Trade Liberalization, 14 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 1129, 1134 (1999).
16 See id. at 1135.
17 See id.
1 See id.
19 GATT, supra note 1I, at art. XX.
'0 See WEBsTERS NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 13, at 57.
21 See WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2502 (1966).
' See Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9.
23 GATr, supra note 11, at art. XX.
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products or produce under similar conditions. Unfortunately, the Article XX
chapeau has been given a much more strict interpretation that has so far proven
insurmountable.
B. Early Cases: Herring-Salmon and Thailand-Cigarette
The first case to invoke Article XX for environmental protection was a
challenge to a Canadian regulation that restricted the export of certain fish.24
The United States claimed that the regulation was intended to protect the
Canadian fishing industry. Canada, however, defended the regulation under
Article XX(g) as part of a long-standing policy of protecting native fish
stocks.2
5
The DSB found that the salmon and herring stocks were an exhaustible
natural resource, but that the challenged regulation was not directly aimed at
protecting the fishery and was, therefore, an illegal unilateral trade sanction.
In reaching this conclusion, the panel interpreted the phrases "relating to" and
"in conjunction with" in Article XX(g) to mean "primarily aimed at."' This
reading of the GATT is inconsistent with a plain reading of the words of the
agreement and significantly reduces the coverage of Article XX(g) to
regulations that are solely intended to conserve the resource.
A subsequent case turning on an Article XX exception involved a U.S.
challenge to a Thai regulation requiring importers of cigarettes to obtain a
permit from the government before importing.2 7 The United States, at the
behest of the American cigarette industry' claimed that the regulation was
effectively a ban on imports because at the time of the suit, no permits had
been granted for ten years.28 Thailand defended the regulation on Article
XX(b) grounds as "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health."29 Thailand claimed, with the support of the World Health Organiza-
tion, that the purpose of the regulation was to protect its citizens from addiction
to cigarettes and more specifically, from the chemical additives in American
cigarettes.3
' Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon, Mar. 22,1988,
GATT B.I.S.D. L/6268-35 S/98 [hereinafter Herring-Salmon].
' See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1139.
2 See id. at 1140.
27 Thailand - Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990,
GATT B.I.S.D. DSIO/R-37S/200 [hereinafter Thailand-Cigarette].
" See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1141.
9 GAT, supra note 11, at art. XX(b).
" See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1142 n.54.
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The DSB ruled against the Thai regulation after adopting a "least-GATI?-
inconsistent" interpretation of "necessary" in Article XX(b).3' Again, the
dispute resolution panel looked outside of the GATT to interpret an Article XX
provision. It is notable that the GAT" exempts regulations 'necessary to
protect human health'; it does not exempt regulations 'necessary to protect
human health' and 'least-GATT-inconsistent.' 32 Unilateral actions, by their
very nature, are inconsistent with the GATr, and this is precisely why the
Article XX provisions are called 'exceptions.' The DSB's interpretation has
the effect of frustrating the purpose of the exceptions.
C. Tuna-Dolphin I & H
The first GATT disputes over an environmental protection trade regulation
that garnered the attention of the general public were the Tuna-Dolphin cases.
In these cases, Mexico and intermediary importer nations challenged the
United States' Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). The act prohibited
the importation of tuna caught using purse-seine nets, which have a high
incidental kill rate for dolphins, an endangered species.33 Dolphins frequently
swim directly above schools of tuna, and fishermen, knowing that the tuna
sought will be below, surround dolphins with purse-seine nets.' After finding
that there was no other technological alternative to prevent dolphin kills, the
United States banned the use of purse-seine nets (effective on American
fisherman) and the importation of tuna caught with them (effective on foreign
fishermen). 5
The first Tuna-Dolphin case (Tuna )) was instituted by Mexico against the
United States on the direct importation ban.' The United States defended the
regulation on Article XX(b) and (g) grounds. Considering previous decisions
by the DSB, the United States argued that the regulation was necessary because
there was no other alternative and that the regulation was primarily aimed at
protection of the dolphins, an exhaustible natural resource.37 In regard to
exception (b), the panel found that the United States had not sought multilateral
31 See id. at 1144.
32 See GATT, supra note 11, at art. XX(b).
3 See Aa'i, supra note 15, at 1145.
34 See id.
35 See id.
"United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATr B.I.S.D. 39S/155
(39th Supp.) (1993) [hereinafter Tuna I].
37 See Aa'i, supra note 15, at 1147.
[Vol. 29:181
WTO & GATT ART. XX
agreements to protect the dolphins." According to the DSB, until international
negotiations were attempted and had failed, trade restrictions could not be
found to be necessary.a9 This is a further extension of the interpretation of
'necessary' that the DSB developed in the Thailand-Cigarette case. Under the
DSB interpretation, in order to be necessary, the regulation must be "least-
GATT-inconsistent." In order to be least-GATT-inconsistent, the regulating
nation must have "exhausted all other options reasonably available to it to
pursue its ...objectives through measures consistent with the General
Agreement, in particular through the negotiation of international cooperative
arrangements. '" The definition presents another substantial hurdle, one that
is nowhere to be found in the GATT and one that must be surmounted by a
nation wanting to protect the environment in order to survive DSB scrutiny.
In considering exception (g), the panel found that since the allowable
incidental kill rate was based on the dolphin bycatch of American fisherman,
4
'
which the panel considered to be too unpredictable, the regulation could not be
primarily aimed at the conservation of a natural resource.42 Using the
American bycatch rate as a measuring stick by which all importers must be
measured may be arbitrary and thus, possibly invalid under the chapeau.
However, the DSB ruled that the regulation was invalid under Article XX(g),
which only requires that the regulation be related to the conservation of natural
resources and be made effective in conjunction with domestic restrictions.43
A few years later, several nations brought suit against the intermediary
nation import provision of the MMPA." The intermediary nation import
regulation required nations that exported tuna procured from other nations to
the United States to certify that the imported tuna was not caught with purse-
seine nets.45 In considering the U.S. Article XX(g) defense, the DSB outlined
the method for determining whether or not a regulation was valid.
First, the DSB must determine whether the regulation was intended to
conserve exhaustible natural resources.' 6 Second, the regulation must be
38 See id.
39 See id.
40 Tuna I, supra note 36, at para. 5.28, n.76.
41 See NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 82 (explaining that foreign fishermen
were not allowed to import tuna when their bycatch exceeded the American bycatch for the same
period by more than a factor of 1.25).
42 See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1148.
' See Tuna 1, supra note 36, at 175.
4 See GATr Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States-Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, June 1994,33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) [hereinafter Tuna 11].
45 See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1149.
46 See Tuna II, 33 I.L.M. at 891.
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related to conservation and implemented in conjunction with similar domestic
regulations.47 Finally, pursuant to the Article XX chapeau, the regulation must
not be arbitrary or unjustifiable." This method is a bottom-up reading,
requiring first that the regulation be scrutinized under the specific clauses of
the exception and then under the chapeau.
The DSB found that the first test was met, but the second was not met since
the MMPA was not "related to" (construed as "primarily aimed at") the
conservation of dolphins."9 They reached this conclusion because the MMPA
was primarily aimed at changing the policies of other countries in regard to the
harvest of tuna, rather than at protecting the dolphins themselves." That
interpretation raises this question: If the method of catching tuna is the factor
that is killing the endangered dolphins, how does one protect dolphins without
changing the method of catching the tuna?
A key decision of the DSB in both of these cases was that the MMPA
regulated processes, not products, and therefore was not justifiable under the
Article XX exceptions."' The DSB's theory is based upon Article XXX of the
GATT, which requires member nations to give foreign products national
treatment.5 2 In other words, foreign products must be treated in the same
manner as domestic products. 3 The United States argued that the national
treatment requirement was fulfilled because foreign dolphin-safe tuna was
treated in the same manner as domestic dolphin-safe tuna, and foreign purse-
seine caught tuna was treated like domestic purse-seine caught tuna."
The DSB found that there was no difference in the tuna itself, whether or
not it was caught with a purse-seine net. Therefore, there was no justification
for the embargo against purse-seine caught tuna.55 The ruling makes it
impossible for a nation to effect environmentally detrimental production
processes through unilateral actions. Such a product-process distinction
effectively abrogates the Article XX exceptions for environmental protection.
After all, it is far more common that the process, rather than the product, is
47 See id. at 893.
4s Seeid. at 1151 n.97.
49 Id. at 1151-52.
'o See td. at 1151.
5' See Carol J. Miller & Jennifer L. Croston, WTO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives:
Assessment of the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 73, 101
(1999).
52 See GAI', supra note 11, at art. XXX.
" See Miller & Croston, supra note 5 1, at 101.
54 See id.
55 See id.
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environmentally detrimental.-6 The DSB's interpretation is contrary to the
purpose of Article XX, a list of exceptions to the GATT. The chapeau
explicitly states that "nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures" comporting
with the listing exceptions.17 The product-process distinction violates the
express wording of the GATT.
Furthermore, the product-process distinction is also proven invalid by the
wording of another Article XX exception. Article XX(e) specifically permits
embargoes of products produced by prison labor.ss The exception is an explicit
allowance of a unilateral sanction based on the process, not the product. The
result may be attributable to the concept that the product is tainted by the
production method and thus, is a different product, no matter how physically
identical the product is to a product produced in a more acceptable manner.
Those in favor of the Tuna-Dolphin decision felt that regulations aimed at
environmental conservation "could potentially undermine the multilateral
trading system." 9 The panel itself stated that policies like the MMPA are
contrary to the objectives of the GATr.' Others opposed to the decision felt
that "legitimate environmental concerns were... sacrificed on the altar of free
trade by trade bureaucrats beyond the reach of democratic control." 61 The
WTO's study, Trade and Environment, states that "the growing public anti-
trade sentiment that followed the tuna-dolphin ruling was a difficult setback for
the GATT, which at the time was trying to conclude the largest and most
complex trade negotiations ever-the Uruguay Round." 62 The controversy
surrounding the ruling led to the reconvening of the Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade; however, it was limited to studying the
validity of existing trade regulations in multilateral environmental
agreements. 63
The Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade entered a
two-year study that culminated in a report that "formed the backbone of the
Decision on Trade and Environment, which was added to the Uruguay Round
Agreement." 4 The report summarized the current GAT view on environmen-
56 See id. at 123.
17 GATr, supra note 11, at art. XX.
"' See GATT, supra note 11, at art. XX(e).
59 NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 10.
' See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1153.
61 NoRDsTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 10.
62 Id. at 10.
6' See id.
64 Id.
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tal policies that affect international trade.6 First, the report stated that GATT
review was limited to the trade aspects of environmental policies.' Second,
the report argued that there should be no contradiction between free trade and
environmental policies; however, if problems do occur, they should be resolved
in a manner that does not undermine the international trading system.6 Finally,
the group found that the GATT and a non-discriminatory trading system could
lead to environmental protection by stimulating income growth.68
The findings indicate that, while the importance of environmental
protection is recognized, the environmental policy will be considered
subservient to trade when environmental policies clash with the international
trading system. Such a result conflicts with the GATT, which includes Article
XX to indicate expressly that, when trade regulations are enacted for a valid
purpose, whether it be morality, public health, or conservation of natural
resources, they should not be struck down because they burden free trade.
D. The WTO and Article A"
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was formed in 1995 to administer
the GATIT.69 The first Article XX conflict brought before the WTO dispute
settlement body was the Reformulated Gasoline case." There, Brazil and
Venezuela challenged the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Regulation
of Fuels and Fuel Additives-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline [hereinafter "gasoline rule"], promulgated pursuant to the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act, which required different baseline establish-
ment methods for foreign importers of gasoline than those used by domestic
refiners.7 The challengers argued that the gasoline rule discriminated against
them in violation of the core provisions of the GATIT.72 The United States
argued that the gasoline rule was justifiable under Article XX because it
promoted lower emissions, cleaner air, and public health.73
6s See id.
6See id.
67 See NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 10.
See id.
See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1131.
70 See WTO Dispute Panel Report on United States-Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Jan. 29, 1996, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R, paras. 6.20-6.43 [hereinafter
Reformulated Gas Panel Report].
" See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1155.
7' See id. at 1156.
71 See id.
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The DSB ruled against the United States and followed an interpretation of
the Article XX subsections similar to that used in earlier cases.7' Regarding an
Article XX(b) defense, the DSB stated that the regulation was not least-GATIT-
inconsistent. 5 The DSB ruled against the United States' Article XX(g) claim
because the regulation was not primarily aimed at the conservation of a natural
resource.
76
On appeal, the WTO Appellate Body reversed the lower court's finding that
the regulation was not a valid exception." The Appellate Body stated that
there was nothing in the GAIT that indicated that the phrases "related to" and
"in conjunction with" should be interpreted to mean "primarily aimed at., 71
The ruling is a significant departure from prior panel rulings. The Appellate
Body applied methods of interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention,
requiring a good faith, plain language reading of treaties.79
Applying this plain reading interpretation of Article XX, the Appellate
Body found that the gasoline rule was applied in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production. In doing so, the Appellate Body found that Article
XX(g) required "even-handedness," not identical treatment, between domestic
and foreign refiners. 0 Therefore, the regulation was a valid Article XX(g)
exception.
The other shoe fell when the Appellate Body proceeded to analyze the
regulation under the Article XX chapeau. This was the first time that a trade
sanction premised on environmental protection survived initial scrutiny to be
tested under the chapeau, and the court applied a test similar to the bottom up
method devised in Tuna I. The Appellate Body announced a two-tiered test
for interpreting Article XX: "first, provisional justification by reason of
characterization of the measure under [the exception subparagraph]; second,
further appraisal of the same measure under introductory clauses of Article
XX.s
8 1
74 See id.
7s See id. at 1157.
76 See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1157 n.131 (discussing the lower courts rejection of the
Article XX(g) exception).
7 WTO Appellate Body, United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, April 26, 1996, WT/DS2/AB/R (96-1597) [hereinafter Reformulated Gas Appellate
Report].
' See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1158.
79 See id. at 1154 (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331).
o See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1159.
sI Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9, at 33.
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The panel stated that the chapeau should be interpreted wholly separate
from the exception subparagraph after the regulation had met the requirements
of that subparagraph." The panel concluded that since the burden of
determining individual baseline documentation for foreign refiners was not so
great as to justify different treatment of domestic and foreign refiners, the
gasoline rule exhibited unjustifiable discrimination and was a disguised
restriction on international trade. 3 Thus, although the regulation was found to
be valid under Article XX(g), it did not survive scrutiny under the Article XX
chapeau.
The most recent case in which a challenged party has invoked the Article
XX exception for a regulation promulgated for environmental purposes is the
Shrimp-Sea Turtle decision. In that case, several Asian nations" challenged
a United States regulation that prohibited imports of shrimp that were caught
in a manner that threatened endangered sea turtles. Incidental kills of sea
turtles could be significantly reduced by the use of Turtle Excluder Devices
(TEDs), which provide an escape hatch in the net for ensnared turtles without
reducing the net's ability to catch shrimp.8" The American regulation was
formulated in compliance with its Endangered Species Act86 and required that
nations, whose fishermen operated in waters where sea turtles and shrimp co-
exist be certified as using TEDs or adopt a similarly effective method before
exporting into the United States.
7
The DSB panel found that it was unnecessary to consider United States
claims that the regulation was justified under Article XX(b) and (g) because,
considering the chapeau first, unilateral trade measures are inconsistent with
the core provisions of GATT and the maintenance of the multilateral trading
system.
[In] light of the context of the term 'unjustifiable' and the
object and purpose of the WTO Agreement [to eliminate
unilateral trade barriers], the US measure at issue constitutes
unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same
12 See Ala'i, supra note 15, at 1159.
83 Seeid. at 1161.
8 See Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9, at 15 (noting that the Malaysian
brief to the appellate board argued that the regulations requiring TEDs should not apply to them
because the endangered sea turtles only survive in Malaysian waters in "negligible numbers").
S See Miller & Croston, supra note 51, at 91-92.
u Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 609, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1537 (1989).
s See Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9, at 4.
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conditions prevail and thus is not within the scope of measures
permitted under Article XX. s
This decision was overturned on appeal because it would have effectively
written Article XX out of existence. s9 The appellate body found that this
method of interpretation "finds no basis in the text of the chapeau."" The
appellate panel also stated:
Maintaining, rather than undermining, the multilateral trading
system is necessarily a fundamental and pervasive premise
underlying the WTO agreement; but it is not a right or an
obligation, nor is it an interpretative rule which can be
employed in the appraisal of a given measure under the
chapeau of Article XX.9
The appellate court continued to state that:
conditioning access to a Member's domestic market on
whether exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy
or policies unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member
may, to some degree, be a common aspect of measures falling
within the scope of one or another of the exceptions (a) to (j)
of Article XX. Paragraphs (a) to (j) measures that are recog-
nized as exceptions to substantive obligations established in
the GAT 1994, because the domestic policies embodied in
such measures have been recognized as important and
legitimate in character.'
On appeal, the United States argued that the regulation fell under the Article
XX(g) exception.93 After determining that the subparagraph must be
considered before the chapeau, the appellate body found that the challenged
a' Id. at 96.
89 See id. at 107.
90 Id. at 106.
9' Id. at 101.
g Id. at 106.
" See Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9, at 25 (noting that the U.S. stated
that both subsections (b) and (g) applied, but decided that subsection (g) was most pertinent;
thus, the U.S. only argued subsection (b) as an alternative if subsection (g) was rejected, which
it was not).
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regulation did fall under the Article XX(g) exception.' The regulation related
to the conservation of sea turtles, which are exhaustible natural resources. In
so ruling, the appellate panel found that the term 'natural resource' was not
limited to non-living commodities."
In considering the next phrase of Article XX(g), "if such measures are made
effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion," the appellate panel applied the even-handedness of the application test
formulated by the Reformulated Gasoline panel.9 The appellate panel noted
that in this case, the regulation not only applied to domestic fishermen as well
as foreign fishermen, but also that domestic fishermen faced civil and criminal
penalties for violations.9" Thus, the regulation was found to comply with all
aspects of Article XX(g)."
The appellate panel then turned to the second portion of the two-tiered test,
which looks at whether the regulation violated the chapeau. The panel found
that though the regulation itself was not facially in violation of the chapeau, its
implementation by the U.S. Department of State unfairly discriminated against
foreign fishermen."° In the wake of the ruling, the United States did not
remove the regulation, but rather it restructured the implementation process to
remove any chance of discrimination.' So far, the new implementation plan
has not been challenged.' °2 Some environmentalists criticized the panel
decision, but the ruling actually may represent a turn around in the interpreta-
tion of Article XX. A caveat to that statement is the extensive discussion the
appellate panel devoted to the importance of the multilateral trading system.
The panel cited agreements that argue against unilateral environmental
protection actions, such as the following statement from the Rio Declaration
on Environment and Development:
Unilateral actions to deal with environmental challenges
outside the jurisdiction of the importing country should be
avoided. Environmental measures addressing transboundary
9 See i. at 129.
9 Seei. at 115.
GATT, supra note 11, at art. XX(g).
See Shrimp-Sea Turtle, supra note 9, at 129.
See id. at 130.
9 See id. at 131.
'00 See id. at 151.
o ' See Gregory Shaffer, International Decision, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 507, 514 (1999).
2 See i.
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or global environmental problems should, as far as possible,
be based on international consensus. 03
The panel stressed the importance of exhausting all other measures to reach a
multilateral agreement before implementing a unilateral declaration. The panel
found that although the regulation at issue dictated that the responsible agency
seek multilateral agreements to save the sea turtles, the agency had failed to
thoroughly fulfill this responsibility."°4
In light of the decision, it is still questionable as to what lengths a nation
must go before it can justifiably enact a unilateral trade sanction without
unfairly discriminating against the multilateral trading system. Into this realm
of uncertainty, the WTO published a Special Study on Trade and the Environ-
ment,"05 which may have the effect of frustrating the progress that has been
made towards accepting unilateral trade sanctions.
In. WTO SPECIAL REPORT ON TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
On October 14, 1999, the WTO released an extensive report on the effects
of trade on the environment. " Issued shortly before the WTO summit meeting
in Seattle, the report was intended to counter arguments that free trade
threatens the environment. Although the report does not expressly discuss the
interpretation of Article XX or the dispute resolution panel, a central motif of
the report is that the key to successful interplay between trade and the
environment is "to strengthen the mechanisms and institutions for multilateral
,,107
environmental cooperation. ...
A. The Status of the Environment
In the report, the WTO admits that trade has had a negative effect on the
environment: "The growing economy has been accompanied by environmental
degradation, including deforestation, losses in bio-diversity, global warming,
air pollution, depletion of the ozone layer, overfishing and so on."' 8 The
report also admits the validity of the Tragedy of the Commons theory, which
,o See Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9, at 168, n.65 (quoting Principle 12
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development).
"10 SeeMi. at 168.
" NORDsTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 7.
10 See id.
07 id.
'w Id. at 1.
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holds that as long as there is no exclusive control or possession of a commod-
ity, it will be overused and abused by those who can profit from it while
externalizing the costs.'"
The report lists some current environmental trends. Global energy use has
increased by 70 percent since 1971 and is expected to continue at a rate of 2
percent per year for the next fifteen years, which will raise greenhouse gases
an expected 50 percent."0 The ozone level is expected to take fifty years to
return to a normal level."' Acid rain is increasing in developing countries."'
Excess nitrogen is overwhelming the global nitrogen cycle, with ill effects
including reduced soil fertility."13 Deforestation is rampant; between 1960 and
1990, 20 percent of the world's tropical forests were cleared." 4 Pollution and
deforestation threaten 58 percent of the world's coral reefs and 34 percent of
all fish species. "' In the next thirty years, two thirds of the nations could face
major water shortages."6
The report places the blame for these environmental trends at the door of
market and policy failures."' Market failures occur when the costs or effects
of environmental degradation are externalized away from the responsible
party."' It is an example of a policy failure when governments enact
regulations that either fail to correct the market cases, or in some cases,
exacerbate the situation."9 Where market and policy failures exist, free trade
can dramatically increase the negative consequences to the environment.' °
The WTO admits that economic integration under the GATI" has "dimin-
ished the regulatory power of individual nations."'' Nevertheless, the WTO
argues that the increasing environmental degradation resulting from GAT
restrictions on unilateral actions only underscores the importance of the
"o See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (discussing
in depth the Tragedy of the Commons theory, especially as it relates to population growth).0o NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 2 (citing WORLD REsOuRCEs 1998-1999,
A GuIDE TO THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT, collaborative report by the World Resource Institute,
the United Nations Environmental Program, the United Nations Development Program, and the
World Bank (1998)).
1 See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
1" See id.
11 See id.
116 See NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 2.
"
7 See d.
"a See id.
119 See id.
120 Seeki.
121 Id. at 1.
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multilateral agreement process. In fact, that argument is "the key message of
the study."'
'
The report describes trade barriers as "poor environmental policies."2' It
states that:
Environmental problems are best addressed at the source,
whether they involve polluting production processes or
undefined property rights over natural resources. What is
more, tackling the problems by targeting some indirect
linkage, such as imports or exports, may divert attention from
the underlying problems. In some cases, putative trade
remedies may even aggravate the problems."
In so concluding, the report relies on case studies of chemical intensive
agriculture, deforestation, global warning, acid rain, and overfishing. In each
situation, the WTO reaches the conclusion that the problems should be solved
* by the removal of inefficient policies such as subsidies and the implementation
of multilateral agreements. The WTO calls multilateral agreements the first-
best method of environmental protection and states that "whenever we sidestep
the first-best principles of environmental policy . .. the benefits not only
become [more] difficult to predict, but we also impose unnecessary costs on
the society."'
The WTO admits that in the past, trade measures have been "a useful
mechanism for encouraging participation in and enforcement of multilateral
environmental agreements in some instances, and for attempting to modify the
behaviour of foreign governments in others.""~ However, the report continues,
"the use of trade measures in this way is fraught with risks for the multilateral
trading system, unless trade policy is used in this manner on the basis of prior
commitments and agreements among governments as to their obligations in the
field of environmental policy.'"
The report's sentiments are reminiscent of the opinion of the lower court in
the Shrimp-Sea Turtle case, where that court ruled that unilateral trade
measures undermined the multilateral trading system and thus, were never
'22 NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 1.
'3 Id. at 3.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
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justifiable under the Article XX chapeau. 28 The report's stance on this issue
undermines the appellate body's ruling in that case and raises the question of
how future WTO dispute resolution panels will rule on Article XX trade
measures.
B. Economics and Environmental Policy
The WTO's justification for striving for free trade is that it will unambigu-
ously raise wealth throughout the world." In developing countries, low-
income levels can lead to a lack of concern over environmental issues. The
report states,
Countries that live on the margin may simply not be able to
afford to set aside resources for pollution abatement, nor may
they think that they should sacrifice their growth prospects to
help solve global pollution problems that in large part have
been caused by the consuming lifestyle of richer countries. 3
To prove this theory, the study relies heavily on the Environmental Kuznets
Curve, which holds that a graph showing income on the x-axis, and the level
of environmental degradation on the y-axis would resemble an inverted 'U'
shape."' In other words, when a country is poor, there is little pollution
because they lack capital necessary to fund polluting industry. As the level of
income increases, so does the degree of environmental degradation not only
because there is more capital for polluting industry, but also because of either
a lack of concern about environmental quality or a lack of capital to invest in
abatement technology, or both."'
At some point, as the level of income continues to increase, the level of
damage to the environment slows and then begins to decrease.' This is due
to increased capital to apply to abatement costs and a conscious decision to
place higher value on environmental quality."3 It is important to realize,
however, that the point where environmental degradation begins to decrease
12' Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9, at 96.
29 See id. at 2.
130 Id. at 6.
131 See NORDSTR6M AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 11.
132 See id. at 49.
'3 See id.
'34 See id. at 54.
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on the curve will not come without the conscious application of environmental
policies.1"
Furthermore, the report suggests that newer studies indicate that the
inverted 'U' shape may actually be closer to an 'N' shape.13 In other words,
as the amount of capital continues to increase, it creates a state of
overcapitalism, such that the amount of environmental degradation will again
increase. An obvious example of the new theory is the current popularity of
sport utility vehicles in the United States. Although these vehicles are much
less fuel efficient than most personal automobiles, the cost of gas is not high
enough to balance against overcapitalization. Though large trucks produce
much higher emissions than most cars, the cost of pollution is externalized and
so does not serve as an adequate deterrent to their use. The report suggests that
the 'N' shape may, in time, lead to an 'M' shape, whereby the level of
pollution again decreases, but there is no support for this argument yet. "7 The
report essentially dispels the validity of the Environmental Kuznets theory
when it states, "what may appear as a relationship between income and
pollution may have little to do with income per.se."38
This point is highlighted by evidence that different environmental indicators
do not uniformly follow the expected curve. 39 The report found that each
indicator followed a seemingly random pattern as income increased. "
Availability of clean water and urban sanitation was found to uniformly
increase with income, but at the same time, so did a generation of municipal
waste and C02 emissions. 4' The upshot is that environmental quality does not
come from increased trade alone, but from increased education and access to
the political system, as well as other innumerable factors."' This finding
disproves the argument that free trade will unambiguously raise welfare and
pay for the environmental degradation that it produces.
C. The Regulatory Chill
The report confronts the theory that free trade leads a race to the bottom as
well as the opposing theory that free trade could lead a race to the top. It
13S See id. at 7.
'"6 See id. at 53.
"' See NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 54.
138 Id. at 50.
1'9 See id. at 54.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id. at 50.
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concludes that although there is no real race in either direction, there is a
definite problem of regulatory chill."3 Opponents to free trade claim that
without unilateral controls, there is a race to the bottom." This theory holds
that without effective sovereign control, companies will move to locations
where they can externalize their costs to the greatest extent possible in order
to maximize profits. 45 Strict free trade proponents sometimes claim that
markets driven by consumers concerned with environmentally conscious
products, combined with local 'not in my backyard' attitudes, will actually
force companies to decrease pollution to the greatest extent possible, creating
a race to the top.'4 The report cites evidence that indicates that, in reality,
pollution abatements costs are generally such a small part of operating costs
(between 1 and 5 percent) that they are not sufficient to drive a race to the top
or the bottom alone. 7
The report does find sufficient evidence that when trade barriers cannot be
used to equalize competition from foreign countries with different environmen-
tal protection values, governments may be politically driven into regulatory
chills in order to maintain competitiveness.'" "Industries often appeal to
competitiveness concerns when lobbying against environmental regulations,
and sometimes with some success."' 49 As evidence of this, the report cites a
successful attempt by the British coating industry to defeat legislation that
would have forced them to reduce emissions of volatile organic compounds,
"a major contributor to city smog and respiratory health problems," because the
cost of complying with the reduced emissions limitations would make the
industry uncompetitive in the international market."5
Similarly, the European Commission proposed a tax on carbon dioxide
emissions, conditioned on its major trading partners enacting similar taxes to
equalize competition. Industrial lobbyists in the United States, Australia, and
Japan killed the initiative.'' This serves as an example of the inefficiency of
multilateral agreements when broad-based support for the issue does not exist.
The EU could have erected import taxes to raise the costs to foreign importers
of goods manufactured by methods that produced C02 and thereby leveled the
141 See NORDSTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 35-36.
'44 See id. at41.
141 See id. at 42.
16 Seeid. at44.
147 See id. at 40.
148 See id. at 46.
149 NoRDsTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 45.
15o See id.
151 See id.
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playing field for fair competition, but this, assuredly, would have been a
violation of the GATT under the WTO's interpretation.
The report itself proves that bars on unilateral sanctions lead to reduced
environmental regulation. Nations, especially smaller ones that are less self-
sufficient and more reliant on international trade, can not afford to institute
environmental regulations when doing so will compromise their ability to
compete in the world market. The problem is even more exaggerated when the
issues involve the international environment instead of the domestic environ-
ment. The Tragedy of the Commons shows that nations will not voluntarily
protect the global environment when doing so will require them to bear a
burden out of proportion with their fair share.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the early Article XX cases, the DSB developed strict interpretations of
Article XX that reserved little role for unilateral actions in global environmen-
tal protection. In recent years, however, the Appellate Body has taken a stance
more consistent with the plain wording of the GATT. The Appellate Body also
articulated a two-tiered test, requiring scrutiny, first, under the specific
exception and then, under the chapeau. This method of review can effectively
ensure that regulations are proper in purpose and fair in execution. The
Shrimp-Sea Turtle case, as much as it has been reviled by environmentalists,
represents a departure from the earlier DSB rulings. The Appellate Body
finally recognized that while unilateral actions are not consistent with the
general goals of the GATT, they were legitimate when premised on the
purposes stated in Article XX and when administered fairly.5 2
The WTO report on trade and the environment may indicate backsliding on
this issue. The report concludes that unilateral trade sanctions are always
second-best methods of protecting the environment and should be used rarely,
if at all.' 3 The report's conclusion is surprising because it admits several
points that undermine its reasoning.
First, the report cites substantial evidence that shows that the global
environment is facing numerous threats, which free trade is not only not
correcting, but is in fact exacerbating. Secondly, the evidence on the
Environmental Kuznets Curve indicates that, contrary to the claims of the
WTO, there is no direct correlation between rising income and environmental
quality. Finally, the evidence shows that regulatory chill is a real problem
152 See Shrimp-Sea Turtle Appellate Report, supra note 9.
Is3 See NoRDsTROM AND VAUGHAN, supra note 10, at 3.
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because nations are reluctant to institute environmental regulations to protect
the domestic environment or to enter environmental agreements to protect the
global environment without being able to utilize unilateral actions to equalize
competition.
It remains to be seen whether this anti-unilateral action stance will influence
the Appellate Body's interpretation of Article XX, but it is hard to see how it
will not. By showing great disfavor, the WTO may influence the DSB to
strengthen the scrutiny it applies to unilateral actions and revert from the
progress made in the Shrimp-Sea Turtle case towards recognizing unilateral
trade actions as efficient and valuable tools for the protection of the global
environment.
